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I. Ground Water Mining
A. Overview
In 1975 eighty-three percent of the fresh,water consumed in the United
States was for crop irrigation. In the western states (Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) the
amount was ninety-one percent. Although the major source of irrigation
water has been surface water, the use of ground water for irrigation has
increased dramatically. Groundwater constituted thirty-eight percent of
the water used for irrigation in the western states in 1975, compared with
twenty-one percent in 1955. The quantity of groundwater used for irrigation
in the western states increased from eighteen million acre feet in 1955 to
fifty-six million acre feet in 1975.
This increase in groundwater use for irrigation has led to the mining
of ground water in several western states, notably California, Arizona,
Kansas, and Texas. Ground water mining occurs when withdrawals from an
aquifer are made at rates in excess of net recharge. Yining becomes
serious when it continues on a sustained basis. As ground water tables
decline, the cost of withdrawing groundwater increases. When the economic
returns from irrigation no longer pay the costs of withdrawal, economic
depletion of the aquifer has occurred.
Ground water mining is not inherently wrong Economic prOblems will
occur, however, when groundwater is mined without considering its future
value. If a groundwater reservoir were not hydrologically interconnected
with surface supplies, and if it were owned or controlled by a single entity,
the decision to mine or not to mine could be left to the owner. Presumably
the decision of whether to nine would be based on balacing benefits from
present use with anticipated benefits fLual future use. But groundwater
reservoirs are often hydrologically related to surface supplies and other
aquifers, and are rarely in a single ownership. Thus, groundwater reservoirs are managed (or mismanaged) as "common pool" resources, such that
excessive use leads to premature exhaustion.
Common pool resources are those for which the right to use the resource
without Charge is shared with others. Usually there is no significant
ceiling on the amount each user may take BerPnge the resource is not priced,
there is no private incentive by any user to rerition current consunption for
use in the future. Any user who does so runs the risk that another user
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will take the resource for present use. There is no incentive to save for
tomorrow, even though there is general agreement that the value of the
resource may be greater in the future. TWo major social consequences
of unregulated development of common pool resource are that Cl.) the resource may be consumed at a faster rate than is desirable, and (2) local and
- regional economies dependent on the resource may Contract. This latter
phenamenam is referred to as the boom and bust syndrome.
Host economists believe that restrictions on groundwater use will
often lead to greater economic benefits than ground water mining. Regulation
of groundwater mining, however, is not widespread in the western states.
The major problem is political. Irrigators have traditionally been given a
high degree of independence in determining how land and water resources are
used in agricultural production. Government water use regulations are perceived as limiting this independence. Irrigators have incorrectly assumed
that these regulations necessarily threaten their economic interests. This
attitude is pith-ably the single most important factor in preventing effective
regulation of groundwater mining.
States and the federal goverrm3ent have a common interest in addressing
the groundwater mining issue. States are interested inmanaging ground
water mining to achieve the greatest economic benefit from groundwater use.
The economic impacts- of depleting groundwater reserAmwould be most significant at the state and local level The federal interest in regulating ground
water mining is snmeuhat different. If the economic depletion of a ground
water reservoir is not planned for, the federal government is likely to be
requested to furnish a supplementary water supply, someri rns referred to as
a "rescue project," at taxpayer expense to sustain an established economy
which developed on the improvident use of ground water.
Inmost western states ground water use is subject to same degree of
state repletion. Significantly, however, in the western states in whidi
sixty percent of the groundwater withdrawn for irrigation in 1975—Cal4fornia,
Texas, and Nebraska--neaninghl state or local controls on groundwater use
historically have not existed. Amore politically popular approach has been
to import developed water supplies to augment diminishing groundwater
supplies This has been accomplished principally at federal expense. in
southern California through the Boulder Canyon Project. Arizona and Texat
are emulating the California experience in attempting to secure a federal
rescue project to deal with their ground water mining problems through the
Central Arizona Project and the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Study, respectively.
B, Groundlgater Controls in Critical Areas
The basic theories of western grant water law do not directly address
the issues presented by groundwater mining: The absolute. ownership and
reasonable use doctrines do not directly address the issue of ground water
mining. Under the absolute ownership doctrine, a landowner may withdraw
ground water without regard to whether groundwater is being mined. Under
the reasonable use• doctrhae, a landowner's right to withdraw ground water
will be restricted only if it is wasteful, if the groundwater is used
on =overlying lands, or both. Otherwise, a landownermsruithdraw-ground
water without regard to whether ground water is being 'mined.
The correlative rights: doctrine, addresses mining of groundwater in
theory by prorating the "safe yield' of an aquifer among groundwater users.
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However, in practice, correlative rights in California is part of the legal
basis for integrating use of groundwater and imported surface water suppliee,
not a policy for restricting groundwater Use.
Appropriation states vary in their approaches for doAling with ground
water mining. In theory, one method of resolving disputes among appropriators
is provided by the basic principle that a junior appropriator must stop using
water when his withdrawals conflict with those of senior appropriators.
Similarly, a policy of restricting new groundwater appropriations may protect
existing groundwater users. However, neither approadhesruill not by itself
necessarily prevent ground water mining.
Special regulation of gnomic' water develowent and use in "critical areas"
is the most cammon approach, being implemented in appropriation and overlying
use jurisdictions through special groundwater development and use regulations
in designated areas TWelve western states use this approadh for desigpated
areas. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-401 et seq., Colo. Rev. Stat. 537-90-102,
Idaho Code §42-233a, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036, Mbut. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-2914,
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-656, Nev. Rev. Stet §434.020, N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-11-13,
Or. REV. Stat. §537.735, Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2, §52.02, Wash_ Rev. Code
Ann. §90.44.130, Wyo. Stat. §41-129. The general objective of suchlegislation
is to slaw or stop ground water mining and to protect existing irrigationbased economies. Specific policy objectives include protection and maintenance
of current irrigation, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-401(A), Idaho Code §42-233a,
maintaining aquifer yield, Ariz. REV. Stat. Ann. 545-401(A), Wash. Rev. Code.
Ann. §90.44.130, and preventing land subsidence, Tex. Water Code Ann. tit.
2, §52.117.
Designating special ground water control areas typically is a state
responsibility. Ariz. REV. Stat. Ann. §§45-412 to -414, Colo. Rev. Stet
§37-90-106(1), Idaho Code §42-233a, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1038, ?Ont. Rev.
Codes Ann. §89-2914, Neb Rev. Stat. §46-658(1), Nev. Rev. Stat. §534.030(2),
N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-11-13, Or. Rev. Stat. §537-730, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§90.44.130, Wyo. Stat. §41-129(b). Contra Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2,
§52.021. The designation process can be initiated either by state officials,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §46-412, Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-90-106(1) Idaho Code
§42-233a, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036, Mont. REV. Codes Ann. §8§-2914, Nev. Rev.
Stat. §534.030(2), N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-11-13, Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730, Wet
REV. Code Ann. §90.44.130, Wyo. Stat. §41-129(b), or upon the petition of
local groundwater users, Ariz. REV. Stat. Ann. §45-415, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§82a-1036, ?Ont. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-2914, Neb. Rev. Stat. 546-658(3), Nev.
Rev. Stat. §534.030(1), Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730, Tex. Water Code Ann. tit.
2, §52.021, Wash_ Rev. Code Ann. 00.44.130, Wyo. Stat. §41-132.
Criteria for establishing control areas vary considerably and include:
(1)withdrawals approaching or acceding a groundwater basin's
"safe yield" or recharge, Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann. §45-412(1),
Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036(b), Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-2914(1),
Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730(3), Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §90.44.130,
Wyo. Stat. §41-219(a)(i),
(2) groundwater level declines, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036(41, Or.
Rev. Stat. §537.370(1), Wyo. Stat. §497122g(4)(ii),_
43). confactibetween grand water users, Neb. REV. Stat. §46:658
(1)(a), Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-2914(3), Or. Rev.. Stat.
§537.720(2), WVo. Stat. §41-129(a)(iii),
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(4)water quality degradation, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-412(3),
Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036(d), Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730,
and
(5)land subsidence, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-412(2).
The groundwater controls authorized in designated areas also vary.
Authorized controls include:
(1)requiring permits for new wells, Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-90-107,
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-659(1), Nev. Rev. Stat. §534.050, Tex
Water Code Ann. tit. 2, §52.114,
(2)restricting groundwater development through permit denials,
Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-90-107, Idaho Code §42-233a, Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§533.370(4) - 534 .110(3), well spacing requirements,
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-666(1)(c), Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2,
§52.117, Wyo. Stat. §41-132(a)(v), or well drilling moratoria,
Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1038(b)(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-666(4),
Nev. Rev. Stat. §534.110(7), Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730(1),
NY°. Stat. §41-132(a)(i) [See also Ariz. Stat. Ann. §§45-432,
45-452 & 46-416], and
(3)reducing ground water use by enforcing priorities, Kan. Stat.
Ann. §82a-1038(b)(2), Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-2915(1), Nev.
REV. Stat. §534.110(6), Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730(a), Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. §90.44.130, Wyo. Stat. §§41-132(a)(ii) & (iii)
reducing presently authorized withdrawals, Ariz. Rev. Stat.Ann.
§§ 45-541 to 45545, & 45-563, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1038(b)(3),
Neb. Rev. Stat.. §46-666(1)(a), Or. Rev. Stat. §537.730(4);
rotating pumping, Kan. Stat. Ann. §82a-1036(b)(4), Neb. Rev.
Stat. §46-666(1)(b), Or. Rev. Stat. 5537-730(b), Wyo. Stat.
§41-132(a)(iv): enforcing voluntary pumping agreements, Or.
Rev. Stat. §573.735, Wyo. Stat. §41-132(c): or purchase and
retirement of ground water rights, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann
§§45-566(A)(6) & 45-567(A)(6).
Groundwater controls are usually not embraced by irrigators. Development restrictions may be favored by existing irrigators because their pumping
rights are protected from ccapetition regarding new development. Development
restrictions will be opposed by potential ground water users who correctly
argue that they are being restricted for the benefit of the groundwater
miners. This argument may have nore force in overlying rights jurisdictions
where priority has no direct role in ground water allocation.
Use restrictions are also unpopular with irrigators who perceive them
as threats to their economic livelihood This ignores two facts. First,
considerable roam for improvement in litigation water use efficiency is
usually possible without substantial increases in irrigation costs See
Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and Western Water Rights Law Reform,
59 Neb. L. Rev. 327, 329-36 (1980). Second, if withdrawals are not reduced
through regulation they ultimately will be reduced because of the reduced
aquifer capacity The issue is whether regulation to extend aquifer life
is preferable to forced reductions in withdrawals because of increased costs,
reduced aquifer capacity, or both.
C. SUpplyAugmentation.
Locally more popular than groundwater regulations is supply augmentation,
particularly if subs i di zPd imported water can be obtained. Supply augmentation
has been implemented on a large scale in ralifornia where the federal Boulder

Canyon project has made imported Colorado River water available for municipal
and agricultural purposes. BerAnse the Boulder Canyon project is the historiCal inspiration for the High Plains study, its political and legal history
will be briefly considered.
The first source of supplemental water used by Los Angeles was the Owens
Valley. Surface water was imported to Los Angeles from the Sierra Nevada
mountains through the 250 mile LA Aqueduct, completed in 1913. Although LA
financed most of the aqueduct and storage facilities the Owens Valley water
was initially used for irrigation in the San Fernando Valley. LA subsequently
had to buy up the irrigated land to obtain Owens Valley water.
The second source of supplemental water for LA is the Colorado River. As
early as 1901 Colorado River water was imported to the Imperial Valley for
irrigation through the Imperial Canal. Ultimately irrigation interests
persuaded the federal Bureau of Reclamation to recommend in 1921 construction
of a major reservoir in Boulder Canyon (Hoover Dam) for flood control, water
supply, and hydropower generation as well as a canal to deliver water to
Imperial Valley irrigators. In 1922 Secretary of State Herbert Hoover net
with the seven basin states to negotiate an interstate compact apportioning
Colorado River between Upper Basin states (tnFraming, Colorado and Utah) and
Lower Basin states (New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona and California). Arizona
refused to sign the initial compact proposal, correctly concluding that
California would prevent Arizona's acquiring as much water as it would have
preferred. A six state compact, excluding Arizona, was executed in 1925,
allocating 7.5 million acre feet (mud) per year to the Upper and Lower
Basin states, respectively. U0 to 1 maf of any surplus Above 15 maf could
be appropriated by Lower Basin states. The °avant did not apportion water
among the Lower Basin states. For this reason Arizona did not ratify the
compact until 1944, when it pursued construction of the Central Arizona
Project.
The compact was ratified by Congress in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928. 45 Stat. 1057, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §617. The Act required California
to limit its annual consumption to 4 4 maf plus half of any surplus available
to the Lower Basin states. The Act was passed in part because LA in 1923
proposed that a second dam (Imperial Dam) and canal (All-American Canal) be
built to deliver Colorado River water to LA and Imperial Valley irrigators.
LA initiated organization of municipal water districts from 13 southern
California cities into the MetropolitanWater District 040. The combined
urban and irrigation interests were able to secure passage of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, authorizing construction of Hoover Dam, Imperial Dam,
and the All-American Canal. Parker Dam was subsequently authorized to complete
the Colorado River Project. In 1931 MWD voters authorized construction of
the Colorado River Aqueduct. Construction of Hoover Dam began in 1931 and
was completed in 1935. Parker Dam and Imperial Dam ware completed in 1938.
The Colorado River Aqueduct was completed in 1939 and the All-American Canal
in 1940. Total project costs exceeded $400 million.
As mentioned Above Arizona ratified the Colorado River Basin compact
in 1944 to pursue development of the Central Arizona Project (CAP). Congressional authorization of the CAP was delayed because of legal uncertainty
regarding whether Arizona had title to sufficient water for the CAP. In
1952 Arizona sued California to clarify Arizona's compact water entitlements.
In the 1963 decision of Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the court
ruled in favor of Arizona, clearing the way tor pursuing the CAP. In 1985
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part of caliFornia's Share of Colorado River water will revert to Upper
Pasin states.
The availability of supplemental water has led to the integrated
use of imported surface water and local groundwater in southern California.
This includes the use of the storage capacity of rained ground water reservoirs to store imported surface water underground. California Supreme
Court decisions have facilitated the evolution of these integratedvanagrement policies by recognizing the exclusive right of recharge entities
to control withdrawals of water stored underground. Los-Angeles v. San
Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (1957); Los Angeles v. Glendale, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
If rights towithirma grand water are adjudicated and withdrawals limited
to each user's proportionate share of the safe yield, recharge entities
can Charge groundwater users for water withdrawn in excess of the safe
yield allocation. The safe yield adjudication process essentially creates
a presumption that ground water withdrawn in excess of the safe yield
allocation is recharged groundwater for which the recharge entity rust
be paid. These water management innovations should not obscure, however,
that ground water users in southern California have thus far reneged to
avoid regulation of ground water development and use because of federally
subsidized interstate surface water transfers. II. The High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Study

A.

Background.

Texas is second only to California in the amount of groundwater withdrawn and the number of acres irrigated. Irrigation fram the-CgallA1A.
aquifer in Texas High Plains (panhandle) began in the 1930S. High Plains
groundwater levels started falling in the 1940s. State legislation
authorized the organization of local groundwater conservation districts,
some of which have (1) restricted ground water development through well spacing
requirements and (2) indirectly limited withdrawals through irrigation runoff
control regulations. The first state water development plan concluded in
1966 that (1) water importation to west Texas from the rest of the state
would not supply enough water to maintain High Plains irrigation, although
limited amounts of east Texas water could be imported for municipal and
industrial use, and (2) federally subsidized interstate surface water transfers
from the Mississippi, Missouri, or Columbia Rivers could stabilize or expand
High Plains irrigation. These conclusions were included in the final 1968
Texas Water Plan. Texas has opted to pursue implerentation of the plan
rather than impose groundwater development restrictions.

B.

e"

The High:Plains Study.
1. Study objectives. Texas, realizing that it needed to persuade

Congress to finance water importation to the Texas High Plains, Obtained
authorization of the $6 million High Plains Study. P.L. 94-587 §193,
90 Stat. 2943 (October 22, 1976). The study authorization, however, reflects
that some political compromises were necessary for study authorization. The
study justifications are (l) "to assure an adequate supply of food to the
Nation" and (2) "to promote the economic virility of the High Plains Region"
(aphasis added). The study objections are (1) "to study the depletion of
the natural resources of [states using] declining water resources of the Ogallala
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aquifer," and (2) "to develop plans to increase water supplies in the area
and report thereon to Congress, together with any recommendations for further
.congressional action." The study must "examine the feasibility of various
alternatives to provide adequate water su pply in the area including but not
to assure ' the
limited to, the transfer of water now adjacent areas
continued economic growth and vitality of the region." The study rust
include evaluating the costs and benefits of various actions and the costs
of inaction. In evaluating water transfer options existing water rights
and future water needs for all affected areas Trust be considered.
The apparent congressional intent suggests that (1) the economic vitality
of the region as a whole is the primary concern rather than the economic
vitality of individual states within the region, (2) depletion of oil and
gas reserves in the region is a valid factor for consideration in addition
to groundwater depletion, (3) sources of supplemental water could include
the Missouri and Mississippi rivers but probably would exclude the Coludhia
river, (4) future water needs of the exporting and importing basins are
considered equally (no special basin of origin protection) and (5) environmental concerns (not mentioned in the authorization) probably are subordinate
to economic development concerns.
2. Study administration. The Economic Development Administration (E14),
U.S. Department of Coamerce, is responsible to Congress for the study.
Because the six High Plains states are responsible for the actual conduct
of the study and have a stake in the study outcome affected, study administration is governed by the High Plains Study Council. Council ammbership
the Governors of the High Plains states, three other state representatives
(usually water rights and/or planning administrators andstate legislators)
appointed by the Governor, and EJA 1.epiesentatives. Eachstate has equal
representation on the Council, making study domination by any single state
more difficult.
3. Study procedures. The study will examine six alternative develooment
strategies: (1) bailine (no change) (2) voluntary and -mandatory water deMand
management, (3) intrabasin water supply augmention, (4): intrastate:interbasin
transfers, (5) interstate water transfers, and (6) nonagricultural dOiropment
options. The baseline and interstate water transfers options are the only
alternatives completed as of this writing.
4. Baseline results. The baseline scenario represent what would happen
from 1977 to 2020 if current public policies are not changed; i.e. no new
groundwater regulations, supply sugmentaticn, or technological innovations.
The baseline projects, however, that irrigation water use efficiency will
Increase significantly. Increasing irrigation costs are projected to give
irrigators sufficient private economic incentives to adopt igpraved irrigation
practices and technologies currently available. Crop prices are projected to
increase in real terms (i.e. discounted for inflation) but not as rapidly as
during the past decade Increasing U.S. population and, use importantly,
increases in agricultural exports are the primary reasons crop prices are
expected to rise. The baseline also evaluates oil and gas production in the
region.
The baseline results indicate that groundwater withdrahmls will decline
frail 22 .11ion acre feet (1977) to 20 million acre feet (2020). Hover,
the number of irrigated acres will increase from 12 million acres (1977) to
13.5 million acres (2020). The economic value of irrigated production will
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increase from $4.5 billion (1977) to $11 billion (7020), primarily because
of increased crop prices. Natural gas nroduction will decrease from 5.5 billion
cubic feet (1977) to 0.5 billion attic feet (2020). Oil production will
decrease from 500 million barrels (1977) to 50 barrels (2020). The real
value of oil and gas production will increase from $3.5 billion (1977)
to a peak of $5 billion (2000), but then decline to $1.5 billion (2020).
The regional irrigation aggregates- indicating an net increase in the
value of irrigated production masksa very substantial shift in the location
of irrigation. The amount of ground water withdrawals decrease approximately 901
from 1977 to 2020 across the region. Mbst of the decrease will come in Kansas
and Texas, whereas groundwater withdrawals will increase in Nebraska.
The amount of Texas ground water withdrawals will decrease 40%, fram 8
million acre feet (maf) (1977) to 4.8 maf (2020). Kansas-withdrawals will
decline 907,, from 3 maf (1977) to 0.3 maf (2020). Withdrawals will increase
in Nebraska 60%, from 8 maf (1977) to over 13 maf (2020). Withdrawals
in Colorado, Oklahoma and Newlifaxico will be approximately 1 taaf throughout
the study period The loss of irrigated acres in Texas and Kansas will be
more than compensated by irrigation growth in Nebraska. Texas and Kansas
also are likely to lose cattle feeding to Nebraska because of reduced
irrigation. Approximately sixmilLion acres will be ceased being irrigated
regionally while additional acres will be only partially irrigated.
The baseline results suggest that regional economic vitality will
improve over the next 40 years The regional value of irrigated production
and oil and gas production will increase from $8 billion to $12.5 billion.
If Nebraska were excluded, however, the rest of the region will decline
economically regarding oil and gas production and irrigation.
5. Interstate transfers. The High Plains Study Council established by
resolution that water needed for present and reasonably forseedble uses
(including instneanuses) will be considered unavailable to importation.
Based on this and other resolutions the U.S. Army of Engineers has identified
four interbasin surface water options. Routes Al and A2 would transfer 2.1
maf and 6 4 maf of water respectively from the Missouri river at Ft. Randall
reservoir in southeast South ,Dakota to soutwest Nebraska, northeast Colorado
and western Kansas at an average annual cost cost of $410 and $360 per acre
foot respectively. Routes B1 and 32 would transfer 1.0 maf and 6 0 maf from
the Missouri river at St. Joseph, Missouri to west Kansas at an average
annual cost of $880 and $352 per acre foot, respectively. Routes Cl and C2
would transfer 2.0 maf and 6.8 maf respectively principally from the Arkansas
river at Van Buren and Cearendon, Arkansas to the northern Texas High Plains
at an average annual cost of $745 and $482 per acre foot, respectively. Routes
D1 and D2 would transfer 2 4 maf and 7 2 maf respectively fLuai the Arkansas,
Ouachita, Red, Sabine and Sulphur rivers in Arkansas and Texas to the northern
and southern Texas High Plains at an average annual cost of $785 and $695 per
acre foot, respectively. (Annual irrigation water use in the High Plains
ranges from two to four acre feet annually.)
The costs of imported surface water averages $600, and do not include
the costs of delivering irrigation water to irrigators. In contrast irrigators
are able to pay up to $100 an acre foot for water only by 2020 if at all.
Implementation of any of the transfer options would require a substantial
subsidy.
Results from the other options are not available, although. one. option
may simulate. the impact of groundwater regulations:.
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C. Cong;rattiortal Options.
The High. Plains Study-resolution indicated two justifications for
the study: (1) -maintaining an adequate food supply to the Nation and
(2) maintaining the economic vitality of the High Plains-region. The
baseline results indicate that food production will increase between 1977
and 2020, although food exports and prices- both will increase. This
suggests that food supplies-will be adequate if somewhat more expensive.
The economic vitality of the region will also improve, althoughmost of
the increase in irrigated production occurs in Nebraska. If Nebraska were
excluded Euw the region, the regional economic picture would be negative
due to oil, gas and irrigation production declines. Water importation to
maintain irrigation in Texas and Kansas would require federal subsidies
of up to $91.2 billion for construction plus -up to $12.7 Billion per year
for operation and maintenance. Whether subsidies of this -magnitude are
politically feasible during what may be a period of federal budget austerity
remains to be seen but appear unlikely, particularily if water supplies from
the Upper Missouri basin are used for en=grprodUction. Perhaps ground
water controls and/or imprcrvements in irrigation water use efficiency in
Texas and Kansas may yet be able to extend the life of groundwater supplies.
If not Texas and Kansas will suffer the consequences of not imposing the
discipline of gramiXi water regulations to extend the life of ground water
supplies.
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